Attack in progressA leaked CI key of ‹ci-deploy-bot› is being used to break in: 6 accounts and machines created.Open the case
AI and agent surface V-034
Finds model tooling and agent servers exposed without authentication, and coding-agent identities with administrative access.
Checks
| Checks | Needs |
|---|---|
| Finds a function URL with no authentication on a model server, MCP server, agent builder, notebook or other AI tooling. | ai endpoint |
| Finds an AI coding agent's role or user that holds administrator, key-signing or privilege-escalation access. | iam role, iam user, iam group, iam policy |
Coverage
Read everywhere
| global | |
|---|---|
‹prod-acct› 123456789012 | Read |
Run history
No run has recorded this rule yet.
Findings
No open findings.
What it fed
No case has used a finding of this rule in the last 30 days.
Techniques
None mapped.
How to fix
DescribeCluster(publicAccessCidrs) / GetPublicAccessBlock / ListFunctionUrlConfigs(AuthType) → restrict by IaC; reversible