Attack in progressA leaked CI key of ‹ci-deploy-bot› is being used to break in: 6 accounts and machines created.Open the case
Compute and AI hijack V-026
Finds GPU, fleet, ML and model access started by principals that never did so before, and AI or mail controls changed.
Checks
| Checks | Needs |
|---|---|
| Finds accelerated instances launched by a principal that never launched them before. | Live events: compute, RunInstances |
| Finds spot or fleet capacity requested by a principal that never requested it before. | Live events: compute, RequestSpotInstances, Live events: compute, RequestSpotFleet, Live events: compute, CreateFleet |
| Finds ML or batch compute created by a principal that never created it before. | Live events: compute, CreateNotebookInstance, Live events: compute, CreateTrainingJob, Live events: compute, CreateComputeEnvironment |
| Finds foundation-model access opened by a principal with no model history. | Live events: compute, PutUseCaseForModelAccess, Live events: compute, CreateFoundationModelAgreement, Live events: compute, PutFoundationModelEntitlement |
| Catches model invocation logging or a guardrail being removed. | Live events: compute, DeleteModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration, Live events: compute, DeleteGuardrail |
| Finds mail sending enabled, or a sending identity added, by a principal that never did so before. | Live events: compute, PutAccountDetails, Live events: compute, UpdateAccountSendingEnabled, Live events: compute, VerifyEmailIdentity, Live events: compute, VerifyDomainIdentity, Live events: compute, CreateEmailIdentity |
Coverage
Could not read anything this run
Run history
No run has recorded this rule yet.
Findings
No open findings.
What it fed
No case has used a finding of this rule in the last 30 days.
Techniques
None mapped.
How to fix
LookupEvents replay for the scope, warden show (receipt) → raise the budget, fix delegation or the spoke trust by PR; read-only